Stark link between obesity and Covid deaths revealed | Financial Times



Stark link between obesity and Covid deaths revealed 

Nine out of 10 deaths from coronavirus have occurred in countries with high obesity levels, according to World Health Organization-backed research that sets out the stark correlation between excessive weight and lives lost to the disease.

The study from the World Obesity Federation (WOF), which represents scientists, medical professionals and researchers from more than 50 regional and national obesity associations, showed mortality rates were 10 times higher where at least 50 per cent of the population was overweight.

It offers fresh insight into why people in some countries die at far greater rates after catching the virus than in others.

Age has been seen as the biggest predictor for severe outcomes, which has led to priority being given to older people in most countries' Covid-19 vaccine rollouts. But the WOF said its report "shows for the first time that overweight populations come a close second". It is now calling for this group to be prioritised for immunisation.

Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, WHO director-general, said the report "must act as a wake-up call to governments globally" to tackle obesity.

Analysis of both the latest mortality data from Johns Hopkins University, and the WHO Global Health Observatory data on obesity, demonstrated that 2.2m of the 2.5m global deaths were in countries with high levels of obesity.

Scientists have sought to understand the difference in death rates between Asian and western countries, as well as low income and high-income countries. The WOF suggests the discovery of the "common denominator" of obesity is an important part of the explanation.

Tim Lobstein, senior policy adviser to the WOF and the report's author, said death rates were 10 times higher in countries where more than 50 per cent of the population were overweight. The increase in national death rates where countries exceeded the threshold of 50 per cent of population overweight was "dramatic".

The report, released ahead of world obesity day on Thursday, did not find a single example of a country where less than 40 per cent of the population was overweight having high death rates. On the other hand, no country with high death rates — at least 100 per 100,000 — had less than 50 per cent of its population overweight. 


Vietnam, for example, has the lowest recorded death rate in the world and the second lowest level of overweight people: just 0.04 per 100,000 deaths from Covid-19 and 18.3 per cent of adults overweight, according to WHO data. In contrast, the UK has the third highest death rate in the world and the fourth highest obesity rate, at 184 deaths per 100,000 and 63.7 per cent of adults overweight. It is followed by the US with about 152 deaths per 100,000 and almost 68 per cent obese. Tedros said: "The correlation between obesity and mortality rates from Covid-19 is clear and compelling." Investment in public health and co-ordinated, international action was needed to tackle the root causes of obesity, he added, as "one of the best ways for countries to build resilience in health systems post-pandemic". Lobstein, visiting professor at the University of Sydney and a former WHO adviser, said governments had failed to tackle obesity over many years despite UN targets. Yet Covid-19 was only the latest infection exacerbated by weight issues: "We have seen it in the past with Mers, H1N1 and other respiratory diseases," he added. The report also made an economic argument for action to control obesity, saying the costs of locking down societies to prevent health services being overrun "could have been significantly mitigated if governments had tackled population weight issues before the pandemic". Of the $28tn projected by the IMF as the global cost in lost economic output worldwide up to 2025, "at least $6tn will be directly attributable to the issue of populations living with excess weight", it argued.  

https://www.ft.com/content/7db2b641-c831-4876-ba0c-0f815a42c8f0

Bridging east-west differences in the EU | Financial Times

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Bridging east-west differences in the EU Common values and interests can draw Europe together THE EDITORIAL BOARD Add to myFT Poland's Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki (L) and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban (R) chat at the start of a two-day EU summit, in Brussels, last month © Olivier Hoslet/Pool/EPA-EFE/Shutterstock Share on Twitter (opens new window) Share on Facebook (opens new window) Share on LinkedIn (opens new window) Share Save The editorial board YESTERDAY 38 Print this page Despite the health and economic costs of the pandemic, the EU ended 2020 in better shape than was feared early in the year. Leaders of the bloc's 27 countries struck a deal on its 2021-2027 budget. They will launch a recovery fund that breaks new ground by letting the EU borrow on financial markets for the purpose of assisting needy countries with grants and loans. The 27 overcame differences to set the ambitious target of cutting greenhouse gas emissions to 55 per cent of 1990 levels by 2030. Finally, the election of Joe Biden as US president in place of Donald Trump promises to lower the curtain on what were the most difficult four years in transatlantic relations since the end of the second world war. These successes should not disguise the fact that, in one area fundamental to the EU's long-term prospects, tensions and misunderstandings persist. This is the relationship between the bloc's old western European states and its newer members from central and eastern Europe. In matters such as the rule of law, liberal democracy, corruption, migration and gender policies, impatience and resentment are growing in certain circles on both sides. Several steps are needed to address the problem. The first is to dispense with the mental map of Europe which divides the continent into two halves, as if nothing has changed since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Such a map encourages western Europeans to see themselves as guardians of a more advanced order, as in the era when the east languished under communism. But it makes central and eastern Europeans, including many critical of political illiberalism and corruption in their countries, feel that they are often on the receiving end of high-minded lectures from the west. In reality, governments and peoples on both sides have a profound interest in making a success of what they share in common. This includes eurozone membership, which unites 19 countries from west and east. It covers security and defence policy, where most EU states are members of Nato. Harder questions concern EU values and national sovereignty. Western European governments are right to insist on the primacy of democratic norms and the rule of law, for the corrosion of these values risks turning over time into an existential threat to the EU's unity. Yet sometimes their actions amount to less than their words. A case in point is the protection afforded by leading western politicians in the centre-right European People's party to central and eastern leaders who fail to uphold EU values. It remains to be seen whether the compromise which the 27 agreed in early December on linking disbursement of recovery funds to observance of the rule of law will be an effective mechanism or an unsatisfactory fudge. But it will need to be more than a western stick with which to beat the east. The record of some western European countries on corruption and the rule of law is not unblemished. The more coherent the westerners' message on EU values, the more they will give heart to millions of people in central and eastern Europe who yearn for improvements in the quality of public life. Yet westerners should keep in mind that, for many central and eastern Europeans, national independence is no abstract concept. Its recovery after 1989 was a prized achievement after decades of dictatorship and foreign oppression. The year 2021 can and should be the time when each side tries harder to understand each other and co-operate on the basis of common interests and values.  

Bridging east-west differences in the EU | Financial Times


Bridging east-west differences in the EU Common values and interests can draw Europe together THE EDITORIAL BOARD Add to myFT Poland's Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki (L) and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban (R) chat at the start of a two-day EU summit, in Brussels, last month © Olivier Hoslet/Pool/EPA-EFE/Shutterstock Share on Twitter (opens new window) Share on Facebook (opens new window) Share on LinkedIn (opens new window) Share Save The editorial board YESTERDAY 38 Print this page Despite the health and economic costs of the pandemic, the EU ended 2020 in better shape than was feared early in the year. Leaders of the bloc's 27 countries struck a deal on its 2021-2027 budget. They will launch a recovery fund that breaks new ground by letting the EU borrow on financial markets for the purpose of assisting needy countries with grants and loans. The 27 overcame differences to set the ambitious target of cutting greenhouse gas emissions to 55 per cent of 1990 levels by 2030. Finally, the election of Joe Biden as US president in place of Donald Trump promises to lower the curtain on what were the most difficult four years in transatlantic relations since the end of the second world war. These successes should not disguise the fact that, in one area fundamental to the EU's long-term prospects, tensions and misunderstandings persist. This is the relationship between the bloc's old western European states and its newer members from central and eastern Europe. In matters such as the rule of law, liberal democracy, corruption, migration and gender policies, impatience and resentment are growing in certain circles on both sides. Several steps are needed to address the problem. The first is to dispense with the mental map of Europe which divides the continent into two halves, as if nothing has changed since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Such a map encourages western Europeans to see themselves as guardians of a more advanced order, as in the era when the east languished under communism. But it makes central and eastern Europeans, including many critical of political illiberalism and corruption in their countries, feel that they are often on the receiving end of high-minded lectures from the west. In reality, governments and peoples on both sides have a profound interest in making a success of what they share in common. This includes eurozone membership, which unites 19 countries from west and east. It covers security and defence policy, where most EU states are members of Nato. Harder questions concern EU values and national sovereignty. Western European governments are right to insist on the primacy of democratic norms and the rule of law, for the corrosion of these values risks turning over time into an existential threat to the EU's unity. Yet sometimes their actions amount to less than their words. A case in point is the protection afforded by leading western politicians in the centre-right European People's party to central and eastern leaders who fail to uphold EU values. It remains to be seen whether the compromise which the 27 agreed in early December on linking disbursement of recovery funds to observance of the rule of law will be an effective mechanism or an unsatisfactory fudge. But it will need to be more than a western stick with which to beat the east. The record of some western European countries on corruption and the rule of law is not unblemished. The more coherent the westerners' message on EU values, the more they will give heart to millions of people in central and eastern Europe who yearn for improvements in the quality of public life. Yet westerners should keep in mind that, for many central and eastern Europeans, national independence is no abstract concept. Its recovery after 1989 was a prized achievement after decades of dictatorship and foreign oppression. The year 2021 can and should be the time when each side tries harder to understand each other and co-operate on the basis of common interests and values.  

https://www.ft.com/content/414d98b9-797c-4d8f-b448-71c87cc00426